How the Greeks Looked at Woman

The level of civilization in any people is measured with reference to certain basic "touchstones" and to that civilization's stance toward them. By gauging the stance of a people, or a person, toward each of these touchstones, we are able to determine the degree of maturity and refinement that person or people enjoys.

Take, for example, the subject of "man" and his worth: how do the members of a people look upon "man" — upon his being, his personality, his rights and duties, his worth in himself and his worth as a member of society, the depths of his personality and the elements of his soul? These are questions by whose answers we can judge the level of the people or the person answering them. And by answers we do not necessarily mean conscious, explicit answers: it is enough to take the unconscious answers, the answers implicit in the people's institutions and in the conduct of individuals, the answers latent in the depths of consciences, embodied in behavior and deeds.

And what we say of a civilization's or a people's stance toward "man," we say also of its stance toward "society," or "the state," or "liberty," and other such vital subjects.

Nor do we exaggerate if we say that among these touchstones, and holding a special rank among them, is "woman." By the measure of a given civilization's stance toward woman, and its view of her, the worth of that civilization is measured.

The stance of a civilization or a people toward "woman," and its view of her, carries implications that extend beyond woman in herself to touch other matters bound up with woman and her being. For the view of woman truly implies the view of "the family," and "marriage," and "love"; and it implies also a particular stance toward human nature, and a particular answer regarding the nature of woman — whether it differs essentially from the nature of man, or whether it is a variation of a single nature: the nature of man. This view likewise implies a particular stance toward woman's task — whether it differs from man's task, and whether that difference is essential, touching the foundation, or secondary, touching forms and institutions incidentally...

The subject of this article is the stance of the Greeks toward woman. In taking up this subject we are not concerned only to gain an objective historical acquaintance with that stance; we are concerned to make of this objective knowledge a path toward forming the sound stance it behooves us to take toward woman, and toward the questions that accompany woman and bear closely upon her — such as marriage, the family, the equality of the sexes, and the tasks of the two sexes in society.

In the light of this study we can also judge, by comparison with the stance of the Greeks, our own stance toward woman. And when I say "we," I do not mean the modern world — that world which, in the lands of the West, has been able to draw from the institutions, the spiritual movements, and the profound experiences through which it has passed a new light to cast upon this problem — rather I mean "we," the sons of the Arab world, especially in this society among the societies of the Arab world whose sons claim that it stands at the forefront of the other Arab societies in evolution and progress.

The Greeks looked upon woman with a view that expelled her from the sphere of man the citizen, qualified for the privileges which social and civilizational refinement presupposes — and cast her down to the rank of slaves and children, that is, to the rank of human beings that have not yet fulfilled the conditions of their humanity, and therefore cannot perform their lofty human task, and have no right to enjoy the prerogatives and privileges of the mature human being. Thus we find the Greek philosophers, poets, lawgivers, and social thinkers banishing woman from the sphere of the human being active in creating the ideal society, and banishing her also from the sphere of the human being to whom the order of the ideal society guarantees particular civil and human liberties befitting the dignity of the humanity embodied in him.

We find them also excepting woman — as they except the child and the slave — from man's lofty virtues. They warn the man, for example, against weeping or cowardice or hesitation — traits they ascribe to woman and child, confining them to those two classes (as Plato did in the "Republic").

And we find them looking upon marriage — that intimate bond between human being and human being, which binds their two destinies with the bond of love and puts an end to the solitude, then the desolation, then the melancholy that accompany the isolation of each, in order to raise upon the ruins of that solitude an intimate life of devoted, self-sacrificing partnership — we find them looking upon marriage as a means of procreation, required by the state's interest in multiplying offspring! So sacred human relations sink to the level of means... and the freshness of life withers, because love — the seat of that freshness and its wellspring — has withered and faded away,

and its place has been taken by considerations of collective political interest...

For this reason we also find them subjecting marriage to legislations, interventions, and considerations that bear no relation to love and intimacy: so that marriage becomes compulsory, not elective; and the partners are chosen by special councils or bodies in the state, instead of each choosing the other of his own full will, by the inspiration of his love, and by the working of that inward harmony which springs from the depths of the soul and the recesses of heart and conscience...

We find the Greeks, accordingly, looking upon woman as a creature whose task is diversion or amusement or production, instead of looking upon her as a human being possessing the intrinsic, final worth of the human being, the sacred destiny of the free human being, and the dignity of the human being in himself...

And we find the Greeks delimiting woman's task in society... She is a means of procreation and a means of diversion; it does not befit her to occupy herself with matters that please her and that she chooses in full freedom; rather she must seclude herself in her house, providing her man his food, keeping his house in order, and overseeing the internal affairs of the household. Thus we find the Greeks narrowing the horizons of woman's interests and activity, and stifling the vitality buried in her soul, as in the soul of man — that vitality which yearns to soar into the spheres of creation and invention, into the horizons of free work and of activity fettered by no consideration!

Such is the classical Greek view of woman — a view springing from a mistaken estimation of her humanity and her womanhood, and suggesting that she be considered a being lower than man in the level of its humanity, and less than he in worth and standing.

Woman, in their eyes, is not man's equal in his humanity — and here is the source of their view of her limited task, her truncated rights, and her lowered station. And woman's femininity, in their eyes, is not a variation of the humanity of man, which embraces both sexes alike — not a rich variation of an abundant nature capable of variety: rather woman, in their eyes, possesses a portion of humanity smaller than man's portion, and lower in quantity...

Within the frame of this view of woman — her nature, her station, her task, her rights and her duties — the errors of the Greek view of human nature in itself become clear to us, and of the meaning of the rich variety within its fertile nature. To this view we may attribute a great deal of the sterility and rigidity in the philosophical and social ideals that come rolling down to us in the Greek heritage, as we attribute to it the paralysis of Greek social institutions. And finally, to this same view we may rightly attribute the barrenness of personal human life among the Greeks — that barrenness which limits the refinement of Greek literature and art, and prevents the human soul from revealing itself there in its loftiest manifestations, its most perfect elements, and its deepest mysteries...