Such is the matter of the immunity of the ambassador or ambassadress. As for the wives of ambassadors, if we go back and leaf through the modern studies on the subject of their immunity,

we find that many authors deny that these ladies have any right to enjoy what their husbands enjoy, resting their case on the texts of certain conventions, such as the Havana Convention concluded in 1928, or the agreement concluded between the Saar and France in 1950, which holds that immunity does not extend beyond the official functionaries and does not attach to the members of their suite; and it is self-evident that the ambassador's wife is not counted among the official functionaries. Yet the courts have kept to the old path, holding that those texts concern special cases and apply only in settling the relations of the contracting parties themselves; the inherited usage and the prevailing jurisprudence are that the ambassador's wife must be treated on an equal footing with her husband as regards that immunity, and that consequently she may not be sued.

Jurisprudence has seen in this a necessity that must be preserved, lest the ambassador become a prey to anxiety through suits against his wife, whereby his freedom would be shackled and he would be rendered incapable of discharging, with serenity and ease, the mission for which he was delegated.

The immunity woman enjoys has conditions that must be fulfilled in her. The first is that the wife be residing with her husband in the country to which he is delegated — and I say residing with him, not under one roof, but rather that no judgment of separation shall have been pronounced between them. Yet this rule has not been applied in some countries, among them Britain, which has preferred an excess of indulgence. On this I cite the following instance: on the eighteenth of November 1907 a suit was brought before the courts of Paris against the wife of a diplomatic representative in the matter of the purchase of an automobile whose price the wife had not paid. Although the wife was at that time not living with her ambassador husband, a judgment of separation having been pronounced between the spouses, the court nevertheless chose to hold that the wife was shielded by diplomatic immunity and not subject to the court's authority.

Let us now ask whether the ambassador's wife, once granted immunity, is entitled to plead it if a suit is brought against her in the country where her ambassador husband resides, when she herself bears the nationality of that country. In other words, and for greater clarity: suppose there were in Lebanon an American ambassador married to a Lebanese woman: would a creditor of hers in Beirut, for instance, be entitled to sue her before a Lebanese court, or does immunity in this case too bar her being sued in Lebanon? To tell the truth, I have not yet come upon any judicial precedent on this point that might cast a glimmer of light upon this knot. But the commentators and jurists in many countries have denied the application of immunity, among them the eminent Niboyet, who said: were we to concede that immunity attaches to the ambassador's wife when she

carries the nationality of the country of accreditation, the doors of justice would be barred in the plaintiff's face; for were the latter to bring his suit before a court of the ambassador's country, its fate would be dismissal for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that the defendant is of foreign origin and resident in a foreign country. But the British jurists do not give this question of nationality sufficient heed, and they proclaim immunity from the mere fact that the defendant is the wife of a foreign ambassador.

Nor has the theory of immunity prevented the courts from affirming their jurisdiction in certain matters arising between the ambassador and his wife, in special cases demanding urgent decision, chief among them suits of separation, maintenance, the lawful conjugal home, and the care of the children of the ambassador or ambassadress when divorce is decreed. We must also make clear here that while immunity covers personal actions, it does not attach to real actions, that is, actions concerning rights over immovable property; for if immunity covered suits of that kind as well, right would be corrupted and justice would go astray, since the general principle of jurisdiction lays down that the court competent to hear real actions is the court of the place where the property lies and no other.

And then: is the ambassador's wife entitled to plead immunity in respect of a debt she incurred before her delegation, or her husband's delegation, as ambassador in the creditor's country? The answer is simple and easy, for the affirmative in this case admits of no dispute if the suit is brought during the term of the diplomatic representation. But if this term comes to an end, must the immunity be preserved? Here we find the prevailing opinion to be for maintaining immunity, though there is in this something justice cannot approve; but usage has established and perpetuated it.

Let us pass to another branch of this subject's many branches: to inquire whether this immunity attaches to the woman delegate or to the ambassador's wife in all countries, or is confined only to the country designated for the representation. In truth the answer to this is not easy, for some have said that immunity never parts from the diplomat's person from the day he leaves the soil of his homeland, journeying to the soil of the state where he will reside for the aforesaid mission of representation. In support of this I cite a judgment rendered on the fourth of November 1950 by the Court of Appeals of the United States in America, in which the court decided that the consul of France in Bogotá, against whom suit was brought while he was passing through the United States, was covered by immunity. There are, however, those who refute this opinion, holding that immunity in the country of passage is negated by the absence of any direct relation between the country of passage and the ambassador's mission. Yet the first opinion is the sounder, and numerous precedents have confirmed it; indeed the commentators go further still, proclaiming that immunity must be upheld not only in the case of passage (Transit) but even during a temporary sojourn in a country foreign to the country

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