The Jordan Problem
It appears that the center of gravity in the international situation has suddenly shifted from Cairo to Amman. It may be very useful indeed for the researcher to delve into the sudden causes that led to this rapid shift, especially since the problem of Cairo is not the problem of Amman. Then this question, too, springs to mind: why was Amman, and no other place, the spot chosen by the weight of Cairo, the source of the international crisis in the Middle East?
The answer to this question is simple in the extreme. To obtain it, one need only go back to the conferences of the Arab kings and presidents — Saud and Hussein, al-Quwatli and Abdel Nasser — in the Egyptian capital, before and after the Saudi monarch's visit to the United States of America. Saudi Arabia and Jordan do not wish to deal with the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union, and they hold that their interests and the interests of their peoples, and the future of tranquility and security throughout the Middle East, all depend upon strengthening the ties of the Arab states with the West, and particularly with the United States of America, which has declared that it stands ready to protect the Middle East from any Communist aggression. Egypt and Syria, however, see the matter the other
way around, and call for the positive neutrality whose name the dictionaries of world diplomacy have not yet recognized.
Saudi Arabia — and before it Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, Yemen, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan — held that President Eisenhower's plan for the Middle East accords entirely with their demands for sovereignty, freedom, and free human dealings, unconditional and unrestricted.
And Jordan — a small kingdom bound to the Arab states by close bonds of brotherhood, interest, and tradition, and which by virtue of its position is the first line of defense and the first target of Zionist aggression — willed that it was its duty and its interest to accept American aid, to welcome the visit of President Eisenhower's envoy, and to exchange views with him on the affairs of its defense and security, after the example of the majority of the states of the Middle East. But international Communism, which King Hussein meant at his press conference on the evening of Wednesday, April 24, refused Jordan this step, and stirred up within it grave incidents which, but for the wisdom and boldness of the young monarch, would have brought dire consequences upon the country. So Nabulsi resigned, and the army's general staff resigned, and the leftist
party leaders met in Nablus and adopted grave resolutions, which they submitted to the King through the Prime Minister, Dr. al-Khalidi. But the King, standing firm against the extremist Communist current, knew how to reject the demands and to rule the kingdom with a wise and strong hand.
Who, then, stands behind the Jordanian crisis? A question that the events now in progress will answer — indeed, the words of the Jordanian monarch at his latest press conference have already answered it, when he said: international Communism wanted to play its accustomed game with Jordan, and chose for it an extremist few from among its sons.
And just as King Saud, King Faisal, President Chamoun, and their governments have been able to lead their countries toward the oases of tranquility and peace, and to secure for them free human contact, so will King Hussein, thanks to his courage and to the loyal men of Jordan, be able to surmount the present crisis, so long as he enjoys the support and backing of loyal Arabs. And then the critics of the policy of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan will realize that they misjudged, and lost their way.
This said — were it not for the disarmament talks now under way in London, the contacts